#### Secure Interaction with an Email Client

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#### Verisoft Consortium



































# Goal: Pervasively Verified Systems












### Academic System Overview







### Our Involvement & This Talk

#### Our Involvement

- Development of a Secure Email Client
- PhD thesis about secure user interfaces

#### This talk

- Demo of the Email System
- Formalizing UI security feature



# Verisoft Email System Demo

# Demo



# Formalizing HCI Security

The user should know what the system is doing.

#### Consistency

Correspondence between system state and user's opinion about system state

Not guaranteed even if...

- the system does show the relevant information (state display conformance).
- the user interprets the information correctly.

Asynchronous updates can lead to inconsistencies!

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Resul	t of	lates	st command:	No	new	email	arrived		
edit	(m)a	il   (	(s)end mail	.   (	f)et	ch mai	1		



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edit	(m)a	il   (	(s)end mail	.   (	f)et	ch mai	1		



# How to Guarantee Consistency?


#### We need...

- a formal method to describe HCI
- a formal definition of consistency
- formal model(s) of interaction(s)



#### Formal Method

Describe user and application by IOLTS




Define security properties by LTL formulae.



#### Formal Method


Describe user and application by IOLTS



Define security properties by LTL formulae.

(see also B. Beckert and G. Beuster, "A Method for Formalizing, Analyzing, and Verifying Secure User Interfaces" at ICFEM 2006)







# Formal definition of consistency

The user knows what the system is doing.

#### Let..

- critical hold in all critical states of the application
- $a_0, \ldots, a_n$  represent critical properties of the application
- ullet  $u_0,\ldots,u_n$  representing the user's assumptions about these properties

Then consistency is defined as...

$$\mathbf{G}(critical \rightarrow ((a_0 \leftrightarrow u_0) \land (a_1 \leftrightarrow u_1) \land \cdots \land (a_n \leftrightarrow u_n)))$$



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
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
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$$\rightarrow$$
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# **Application Model**


#### **Application Model**








# Basic Model with Application





# Basic Model with Main Loops



Result	of	latest	command:	No	new	email	arrived	
edit (m	n) a:	il   (s)	end mail	(1	f)eto	h mail	 L	 



Result of latest command: No new email arrived
Problem:
How does the user know if command
execution is completed?
edit (m)ail   (s)end mail   (f)etch mail



Result of	latest command: No new email arrived
	Problem:
	How does the user know if command
	execution is completed?
	Add a status line!
edit (m)a	il   (s)end mail   (f)etch mail



```
System: Waiting for input...
Result of latest command: No new email arrived
edit (m)ail | (s)end mail | (f)etch mail
```



```
System: Waiting for input...
Result of latest command: No new email arrived
edit (m)ail | (s)end mail | (f)etch mail
```



•	aiting for input latest command: No new email arrived
	Problem:
	A status line is not enough
edit (m)ai	1   (s)end mail   (f)etch mail



```
System: Waiting for input...
Result of latest command: No new email arrived
           Problem:
           A status line is not enough...
                            Add a "status" key!
edit (m)ail | (s)end mail | (f)etch mail
```



```
System: Waiting for input...
Result of latest command: No new email arrived
edit (m)ail | (s)end mail | (f)etch mail
```




```
System: Waiting for input...
Result of latest command: No new email arrived
edit (m)ail | (s)end mail | (f)etch mail
```



```
System: Ready!
Result of latest command: No new email arrived
edit (m)ail | (s)end mail | (f)etch mail
```





#### Summary

- Developed formal model of HCI describing TTY applications
- Defined consistency
- Showed that common implementations are not consistent
- Proposed a consistent alternative
- Integrated with other methods (not shown in this presentation)

