

Applications of Formal Verification


Model Checking with Temporal Logic

Bernhard Beckert · Mattias Ulbrich | SS 2019



Model Checking with SPIN







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 - end labels
 - accept labels
 - progress labels



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- never claims
- temporal logic formulas



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- assertion statements
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stating properties outside model using

- never claims
- temporal logic formulas (today's main topic)

Model Checking of Temporal Properties



many correctness properties not expressible by assertions

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model checking of properties formulated in temporal logic

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Remark:

in this course, "temporal logic" is synonymous to "linear temporal logic" (LTL)



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Example: mutual exclusion expressed by adding assertion into *each* critical section.

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Drawbacks:

- no separation of concerns (model vs. correctness property)
- changing assertions is error prone (easily out of synch)
- easy to forget assertions: correctness property might be violated at unexpected locations
- many interesting properties not expressible via assertions



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SS 2019



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all these are temporal properties ⇒ use temporal logic

Boolean Temporal Logic



talking about numerical variables (like in critical ≤ 1 or $0 \leq i \leq 1$ en-1) requires variation of propositional temporal logic which we call Boolean temporal logic:

Boolean expressions (over PROMELA variables), rather than propositions, form basic building blocks of the logic



Set For_{BTL} of Boolean Temporal Formulas (simplified)

■ all PROMELA variables and constants of type bool/bit are ∈ For_{BTI}

PROMELA



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- if e1 and e2 are numerical PROMELA expressions, then all of e1==e2, e1!=e2, e1<=e2, e1<=e2, e1>=e2 are ∈ For_{BTL}



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- if ϕ and ψ are formulas \in For_{BTL}, then all of

$$\neg \phi, \quad \phi \land \land \psi, \quad \phi \lor \lor \psi, \quad \phi \to \psi, \quad \phi \longleftrightarrow \psi$$
$$[]\phi, \quad <>\phi, \quad \phi \lor \psi$$

are ∈ For_{BTL}



A run σ through a PROMELA model M is a chain of states



 \mathcal{L}_j maps each running process to its current location counter. From \mathcal{L}_j to \mathcal{L}_{j+1} , only one of the location counters has advanced (exception: channel rendezvous).

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
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
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Evaluating other formulas $\in For_{BTL}$ in a run σ : as usual (see the book / "Formale Systeme").

Boolean Temporal Logic Support in SPIN



SPIN supports Boolean temporal logic

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SPIN supports Boolean temporal logic but

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Boolean Temporal Logic Support in SPIN



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arithmetic operators (+,-,*,/,...), relational operators (=-,!=,<,<=,...), label operators (@) cannot appear directly in TL formulas given to SPIN

instead

Boolean expressions must be abbreviated using #define

Temporal Logic Quiz



What does the following LTL formula mean?

[]((Q & !R & <>R) -> (P -> (!R U (S & !R))) U R)

Temporal Logic Quiz



What does the following LTL formula mean?

$$[]((Q \& !R \& <>R) -> (P -> (!R U (S \& !R))) U R)$$

P triggers S between Q (e.g., end of system initialization) and R (start of system shutdown).



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example: '[](critical <= 1)'</pre>

"it is guaranteed throughout each run that at most one process is in its critical section"

or equivalently:

"more than one process being in its critical section will never happen"

Applying Temporal Logic to Critical Section Problem



We want to verify '[] (critical<=1)' as correctness property of:

```
active proctype P() {
  do :: /* non-critical activity */
        atomic {
          !inCriticalQ;
          inCriticalP = true
        critical++:
        /* critical activity */
        critical --:
        inCriticalP = false
  od
/* similarly for process Q */
```

Model Checking a Safety Property with JSPIN



- add '#define mutex (critical <= 1)' to PROMELA file</pre>
- open PROMELA file
- enter []mutex in LTL text field
- Select Translate to create a 'never claim', corresponding to the negation of the formula
- ensure Safety is selected
- select Verify
- (if necessary) select Stop to terminate too long verification

Never Claims



you may ignore them, but if you are interested:

- a never claim tries to show the user wrong
- it defines, in terms of PROMELA, all violations of a wanted correctness property
- it is semantically equivalent to the negation of the wanted correctness property
- JSPIN adds the negation for you
- using SPIN directly, you have to add the negation yourself

Model Checking a Safety Property with SPIN directly



Command Line Execution

```
make sure '#define mutex (critical <= 1)' is in
safety1.pml</pre>
```

- > spin -a -f "!([] mutex)" safety1.pml
- > gcc -DSAFETY -o pan pan.c
- > ./pan

Temporal MC Without Ghost Variables



We want to verify mutual exclusion without using ghost variables

```
#define mutex ! (P@cs && Q@cs)
bool inCriticalP = false, inCriticalO = false;
active proctype P() {
 do :: atomic {
          !inCriticalQ;
          inCriticalP = true
cs: /* critical activity */
        inCriticalP = false
 od
/* similarly for process Q */
/* with same label cs:
```

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/* similarly for process Q */
/* with same label cs:
Verify '[]mutex' with JSPIN.
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Often of the form $<>\phi$: something good, ϕ , eventually happens in each run

example: '<>csp'

(with \mathtt{csp} a variable only true in the critical section of \mathtt{P})

"in each run, process P visits its critical section eventually"

Applying Temporal Logic to Starvation Problem



We want to verify '<>csp' as correctness property of:

```
active proctype P() {
  do :: /* non-critical activity */
        atomic {
          !inCriticalQ;
          inCriticalP = true
        csp = true;
        /* critical activity */
        csp = false;
        inCriticalP = false
  od
/* similarly for process Q */
/* here using csq
```

Model Checking a Liveness Property with JSPIN



- open PROMELA file
- enter <>csp in LTL text field
- select Translate to create a 'never claim', corresponding to the negation of the formula
- ensure that Acceptance is selected (SPIN will search for accepting cycles through the never claim)
- for the moment uncheck Weak Fairness (see discussion below)
- select Verify



Verification fails.

Why?



Verification fails.

Why?

The liveness property on one process 'had no chance'.

The scheduler can unfairly select the other process all the time.

Fairness



Does the following PROMELA model necessarily terminate?

Fairness



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```
byte n = 0;
bool flag = false;
active proctype P() {
   do :: flag -> break;
        :: else -> n = 5 - n;
   od
}
active proctype Q() {
   flag = true
}
```

Termination guaranteed only if scheduling is (weakly) fair!

Fairness



Does the following PROMELA model necessarily terminate?

Termination guaranteed only if scheduling is (weakly) fair!

Definition (Weak Fairness)

A run is called weakly fair iff the following holds: each continuously executable statement is executed eventually.

Model Checking Liveness with Weak Fairness!



Always switch Weak Fairness on when checking for liveness!

- open PROMELA file
- 2 enter <>csp in LTL text field
- Select Translate to create a 'never claim', corresponding to the negation of the formula
- ensure that Acceptance is selected (SPIN will search for accepting cycles through the never claim)
- ensure Weak Fairness is checked
- select Verify

Model Checking Liveness with SPIN directly



Command Line Execution

```
> spin -a -f "!csp" liveness1.pml
```

```
> gcc -o pan pan.c
```



Verification fails again.

Why?



Verification fails again.

Why?

Weak fairness is still too weak.



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Note that !inCriticalQ is not continuously executable!



Verification fails again.

Why?

Weak fairness is still too weak.

Note that !inCriticalQ is not continuously executable!

Designing a fair mutual exclusion algorithm is complicated.

Literature for this Lecture



Ben-Ari Chapter 5

Progress Labels



- name starts with progress.
- must be traversed (infinitely often) in any infinite execution,
- otherwise: "non-progress cycle".

Accept Labels



- name starts with accept.
- state cannot persist forever, and
- cannot be revisited infinitely often