Information Flow in Object-Oriented Software. Extended Version Bernhard Beckert, Daniel Bruns, Vladimir Klebanov, Christoph Scheben, Peter H. Schmitt, and Mattias Ulbrich This paper contributes to the investigation of object-sensitive information flow properties for sequential Java, i.e., properties that take into account information leakage through objects, as opposed to primitive values. We present two improvements to a popular object-sensitive noninterference property. Both reduce the burden on analysis and monitoring tools. The second contribution is a formalization of this property in a program logic - JavaDL in our case - which allows using an existing tool without requiring program modification. The third contribution is a novel fine-grained specification methodology. In our approach, arbitrary JavaDL terms (read 'side-effect-free Java expressions') may be assigned a security level - in contrast to security labels being attached to fields and variables only.