
Formal Verification of Software

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Web Page

**All information relevant to this lecture can be found on the web page
www.uni-koblenz.de/~beckert/Lehre/Verification**

Contents

- **Why verification?**
Advantages and disadvantage. Costs and gains.

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- **Basics of deductive program verification:**
Hoare Logic and Dynamic Logic

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Advantages and disadvantage. Costs and gains.
- **Basics of deductive program verification:**
Hoare Logic and Dynamic Logic
- **Deductive verification of object-oriented programming languages**
(using Java as an example)

Why Formal Methods?

Quality: Important for ...

- **Safety-critical applications** (railway switches)
- **Security-critical applications** (access control, electronic banking)
- **Financial reasons** (phone cards)
- **Legal reasons** (electronic signature, EAL6/7 in Common Criteria)

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Productivity: Important for ...

Obvious reasons

Why Formal Methods?

Quality through ...

- Better and more precise understanding of model and implementation
- Better written software (modularisation, information hiding, ...)
- Error detection with runtime checks
- Test case generation
- Static analysis
- Deductive verification

Why Formal Methods?

Productivity through

- Error detection in early stages of development
- Re-use of components (requires specification and validation)
- Better documentation, maintenance
- Test case generation
- Knowledge about formal methods leads to better software development

Testing

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 - Randomly chosen
 - Intelligently chosen (by hand: expensive!)
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- **What about the observation? (test oracle)**

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Challenges can be addressed by/require formal methods

Favourable Development

Design and specification

- **Unified Modeling Language – UML**

Graphical language for object-oriented modelling
Standard of Object Management Group (OMG)

- **Object Constraint Language – OCL**

Formal textual assertion language
UML Substandard

Favourable Development

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- **Consolidation and documentation of design knowledge**

Patterns, idioms, architectures, frameworks, etc.

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Industrial implementation languages

- **Java, C#**

Types of Requirements

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- **functional requirements**
- **communication, protocols**
- **real-time requirements**
- **memory use**
- **security**
- **etc.**

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Different Formal Methodsx

- deductive verification
- model checking
- static analysis
- run-time checks
(of formel specification)

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(of formal specification)

Limitations of Formal Methods

Possible reasons for errors

- **Program is not correct (does not satisfy the specification)**
Formal verification proves absence of this kind of error
- **Program is not adequate (error in specification)**
Formal specification/verification avoid/find this kind of error
- **Error in operating system, compiler, hardware**
Not avoided (unless compiler etc. specified/verified)

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No full specification/verification

In general, it is neither useful nor feasible to fully specify and verify large software systems. Then, formal methods are restricted to:

- Important parts/modules
- Important properties/requirements

The Main Point of Formal Methods is Not

- To show “correctness” of entire systems
(What IS correctness? Always go for specific properties!)
- To replace testing entirely
- To replace good design practices

There is no silver bullet that lets you get away without writing crystal clear requirements and good design, in particular, Formal Methods aren't one


But

- **Formal proof can replace many test cases**
- **Formal methods can be used in automatic test case generation**
- **Formal methods improve the quality of specifications**


A Fundamental Fact

Formalisation of system requirements is hard


Difficulties in Creating Formal Models




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Difficulties in Creating Formal Models



Another Fundamental Fact

Proving properties of systems can be hard


System Abstraction Level

● Low level of abstraction

- Finitely many states
- Tedious to program, worse to maintain
- Automatic proofs are (in principle) possible


● High level of abstraction

- Complex datatypes and control structures
- Easier to program
- Automatic proofs (in general) impossible!



Specification Abstraction Level

- **Low level of abstraction**
 - Finitely many cases
 - Approximation, low precision
 - Automatic proofs are (in principle) possible
- **High level of abstraction**
 - General properties
 - High precision, tight modeling
 - Automatic proofs (in general) impossible!



Main Approaches


High-level programs, Complex properties	High-level programs, Simple properties
Low-level programs, Complex properties	Low-level programs, Simple properties

Main Approaches

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**Model
Checking**

Main Approaches




Proof Automation

● “Automatic” Proof

- No interaction
- Sometimes help is required anyway
- Formal specification still “by hand”

● “Semi-Automatic” Proof

- Interaction may be required
- Very often proof tool suggests proof rules
- Proof is checked by tool



SPIN at Bell Labs

Feature interaction for telephone call processing software

- Tool works directly on C source code
- Web interface to track properties
- Work farmed out to large numbers of computers
- Finds shortest possible error trace
- 18 months, 300 versions, 75 bugs found
- Main burden: Defining meaningful properties

SLAM at Microsoft

- **Device drivers running in “kernel mode” should respect API**
- **Third-party device drivers that do not respect APIs responsible for 90% of Windows crashes**
- **SLAM inspects C code, builds a finite state machine, checks requirements**
- **Being turned into a commercial tool right now**

Future Trends

- **Design for formal verification**
- **Combining automatic methods with theorem provers**
- **Combining static analysis of programs with automatic methods and with theorem provers**
- **Combining test and formal verification**
- **Integration of formal methods into SW development process**
- **Integration of formal method tools into CASE tools**

Formal Methods

- **Are (more and more) used in practice**
- **Can shorten development time**
- **Can push the limits of feasible complexity**
- **Can increase product quality**

Formal Methods

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Those responsible for software management should consider formal methods, in particular, where safety-critical, security-critical, and cost-intensive software is concerned