@InProceedings{BeckertBrunsKlebanovEA2013, author = {Bernhard Beckert and Daniel Bruns and Vladimir Klebanov and Christoph Scheben and Peter H. Schmitt and Mattias Ulbrich}, title = {Information Flow in Object-Oriented Software}, booktitle = {23rd International Symposium on Logic-Based Program Synthesis and Transformation ({LOPSTR} 2013), Revised Selected Papers}, editor = {Gopal Gupta and Ricardo Pe{\~n}a}, language = {english}, year = {2013}, month = sep, publisher = {Springer}, series = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science}, volume = {8901}, pages = {19--37}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-14125-1_2}, isbn = {978-3-319-14125-1}, abstract = {This paper contributes to the investigation of object-sensitive information-flow properties for sequential Java, i.e., properties that take into account information leakage through objects, as opposed to primitive values. We present two improvements to a popular object-sensitive non-interference property. Both reduce the burden on analysis and monitoring tools. The second contribution is a formalization of this property in a program logic -- JavaDL in our case -- which allows using an existing tool without requiring program modification. The third contribution is a novel fine-grained specification methodology. In our approach, arbitrary JavaDL terms (read side-effect-free Java expressions) may be assigned a security level -- in contrast to security labels being attached to fields and variables only.} }
Information Flow in Object-Oriented Software
Autor(en): | Bernhard Beckert, Daniel Bruns, Vladimir Klebanov, Christoph Scheben, Peter H. Schmitt und Mattias Ulbrich |
---|---|
In: | 23rd International Symposium on Logic-Based Program Synthesis and Transformation (LOPSTR 2013), Revised Selected Papers |
Verleger: | Springer |
Reihe: | Lecture Notes in Computer Science |
Band: | 8901 |
Jahr: | 2013 |
Seiten: | 19-37 |
DOI: | 10.1007/978-3-319-14125-1_2 |
Abstract
This paper contributes to the investigation of object-sensitive information-flow properties for sequential Java, i.e., properties that take into account information leakage through objects, as opposed to primitive values. We present two improvements to a popular object-sensitive non-interference property. Both reduce the burden on analysis and monitoring tools. The second contribution is a formalization of this property in a program logic – JavaDL in our case – which allows using an existing tool without requiring program modification. The third contribution is a novel fine-grained specification methodology. In our approach, arbitrary JavaDL terms (read side-effect-free Java expressions) may be assigned a security level – in contrast to security labels being attached to fields and variables only.