@InProceedings{moserGrimmEA2024, title = {Recommendations for Implementing Independent Individual Verifiability in Internet Voting}, author = {Florian Moser and R{\"{u}}diger Grimm and Tobias Hilt and Michael Kirsten and Christoph Niederbudde and Melanie Volkamer}, year = {2024}, month = oct, booktitle = {9th International Joint Conference on Electronic Voting ({E-Vote-ID} 2024)}, venue = {Tarragona, Spain}, eventdate = {2024-10-02/2024-10-04}, series = {Lecture Notes in Informatics}, publisher = {Gesellschaft f{\"{u}}r Informatik}, abstract = {End-to-end verifiable systems are employed to safeguard the integrity of Internet voting. Voter-initiated verification for individual verifiability require that the ballot formed on the voter’s device is audited on a second device, which is independent of a potentially manipulated voter’s device. Further trust is gained by executing the verification procedure on a second device with independent implementations, in order to defend against a dishonest primary system operator. This paper formulates recommendations to implement such independent individual verifiability tools. Our recommendations are based on the experiences made in the GI elections 2023 where such independent tools were made available to the voters – to our knowledge the first project of its kind.}, url = {https://hal.science/hal-04663997} }
Recommendations for Implementing Independent Individual Verifiability in Internet Voting
Author(s): | Florian Moser, Rüdiger Grimm, Tobias Hilt, Michael Kirsten, Christoph Niederbudde, and Melanie Volkamer |
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In: | 9th International Joint Conference on Electronic Voting (E-Vote-ID 2024) |
Publisher: | Gesellschaft für Informatik |
Series: | Lecture Notes in Informatics |
Year: | 2024 |
URL: | https://hal.science/hal-04663997 |
Abstract
End-to-end verifiable systems are employed to safeguard the integrity of Internet voting. Voter-initiated verification for individual verifiability require that the ballot formed on the voter’s device is audited on a second device, which is independent of a potentially manipulated voter’s device. Further trust is gained by executing the verification procedure on a second device with independent implementations, in order to defend against a dishonest primary system operator. This paper formulates recommendations to implement such independent individual verifiability tools. Our recommendations are based on the experiences made in the GI elections 2023 where such independent tools were made available to the voters – to our knowledge the first project of its kind.