@InProceedings{moserKirstenDoerre2024, title = {SoK: Mechanisms Used in Practice for Verifiable Internet Voting}, author = {Florian Moser and Michael Kirsten and Felix D{\"{o}}rre}, year = {2024}, month = oct, booktitle = {9th International Joint Conference on Electronic Voting ({E-Vote-ID} 2024)}, venue = {Tarragona, Spain}, eventdate = {2024-10-02/2024-10-04}, series = {Lecture Notes in Informatics}, publisher = {Gesellschaft f{\"{u}}r Informatik}, abstract = {Increasing demands for internet voting instigated the deployment of a multitude of systems used in practice. Within this work, we are interested in which security mechanisms are currently used by vendors to implement verifiable and secret elections. We perform a systematic market study and review academic literature, where out of 82 candidate systems, we find 29 internet voting systems that are both in active use and claim to employ some form of verifiability. Thereof, we characterize and systematize the 18 systems that provide sufficient information to extract their security mechanisms relevant for state-of-the-art verifiability and secrecy. Overall, we find that only eight systems are well-documented, of which only a few employ state-of-the-art mechanisms in all categories that we consider.}, url = {https://hal.science/hal-04686386} }
SoK: Mechanisms Used in Practice for Verifiable Internet Voting
Autor(en): | Florian Moser, Michael Kirsten und Felix Dörre |
---|---|
In: | 9th International Joint Conference on Electronic Voting (E-Vote-ID 2024) |
Verleger: | Gesellschaft für Informatik |
Reihe: | Lecture Notes in Informatics |
Jahr: | 2024 |
URL: | https://hal.science/hal-04686386 |
Abstract
Increasing demands for internet voting instigated the deployment of a multitude of systems used in practice. Within this work, we are interested in which security mechanisms are currently used by vendors to implement verifiable and secret elections. We perform a systematic market study and review academic literature, where out of 82 candidate systems, we find 29 internet voting systems that are both in active use and claim to employ some form of verifiability. Thereof, we characterize and systematize the 18 systems that provide sufficient information to extract their security mechanisms relevant for state-of-the-art verifiability and secrecy. Overall, we find that only eight systems are well-documented, of which only a few employ state-of-the-art mechanisms in all categories that we consider.