Distance Rationalization for Modular Construction of Verified Voting Rules
Forschungsthema: | Computational Social Choice |
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Typ: | BA |
Datum: | 2021-08-16 |
Betreuer: | Michael Kirsten |
Aushang: |
Abstract
Voting rules are procedures that map the preferences of several voters to a
collective decision.
The process of distance rationalizing a voting rule means to interpret them as
procedures that elect an uncontroversial winner if there is one, and otherwise
elect the candidates that are as close to becoming an uncontroversial winner as
possible.
We can use distance rationalization as a modular construction scheme for voting
rules:
The choice of three components - a distance on votes, a norm and a consensus
class - characterizes a voting rule.
Moreover, some desirable fairness properties of voting rules can be inferred
from properties of such components, each satisfied by several voting rule
instances simultaneously.
In this thesis, we formalize distance rationalization as an extension of the
verified construction framework within
Isabelle/HOL.
We add suitable lemmata and construction rules to the inference rules for the
two properties of anonymity and monotonicity, and verify the anonymity proof
within Isabelle/HOL.
In our evaluation, we apply the formalized construction rules and the anonymity
proof to the two voting rules by Kemeny and Borda, and thereby demonstrate the
use of our framework extensions.
Literature
- "Automated Verification for Functional and Relational Properties of Voting Rules" in Sixth International Workshop on Computational Social Choice (COMSOC 2016)
- "Verified Construction of Fair Voting Rules" in 29th International Symposium on Logic-Based Program Synthesis and Transformation (LOPSTR 2019)